ABSTRACT After the Russian Revolution, with civil war and interventions, war communism (1918-1921) 
More directly related to Russnorvegoles, work has been carried out by Yngve Astrup, Evgeny Ovsyankin and Andrej Repnevskij. The problem with their work is its incomplete treatment of the corporate history of Russnorvegoles. Astrup (2011 Astrup ( , 2012 is not comprehensive, in particular on the second half of the company's history. Ovsyankin (1993) provides only a very short overview, and Repnevskij (1998 Repnevskij ( , 2010 Repnevskij ( , 2013 focuses mainly on other areas than the corporate history that we are interested in.
1 Given the importance of Russnorvegoles indicated above, what we offer is a fuller history of the company. In particular, we provide a detailed account of the last two and a half years in which Western interests still played a role. Moreover, our more specific research ambition has been to clarify the complex currency arrangements in which the company involved
itself.
In what follows, we make use of sources that have also been mined by others, but in a way that yields new insights into the history of Russnorvegoles. This is a result of our work with sources in both Russian and Norwegian archives, among others. Of particular use has been the archival material found in the Prytz Archive, placed in the National Archives of Norway.
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The history of Russnorvegoles is multifaceted, and it is therefore advisable to avoid too much detail. In framing our work as a corporate history, presented chronologically and without too many detours, we have pursued a traditional approach that we hope will clarify the short but complex history of Russnorvegoles. Following this Introduction, Section 2 includes a brief summary of the background required for understanding the establishment of Russnorvegoles, as presented in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, structural aspects of the company are discussed. Section 6 discusses the early emergence of problems with profitability, resulting in relations between Soviet and Western interests becoming more complicated and difficult. Russnorvegoles became entangled in the effects of the Soviet government's introduction, through a decree on 9 July 1926, of stricter currency regulations, discussed in Section 7. In Section 8, we explain how Russnorvegoles tried to bypass these currency regulations. Section 9 explores the role of Quisling in the history of the company. In Sections 10 and 11 the reorganization of Western interests is examined, with the final Soviet takeover of the company. Finally, Section 12 gives an account of the way in which the liquidation of this joint Norwegian-Soviet company made Frederik Prytz a wealthy man, enabling him to establish himself as a Nazi leader in Norway.
Background
The The rich forest resources in the White Sea area were industrially exploited mainly from around 1880, when steam-driven frame-saws were introduced more generally. 3 However, as Björklund (2000) points out, other factors also contributed to what became a booming expansion, in which entrepreneurs from abroad, including Norway, played an important part. 4 In the late autumn of 1917, with the October Revolution, history took a dramatic turn. However, in the White Sea area, centred in Archangelsk, the Bolsheviks were overthrown (see Goldin 1993 Goldin , 2000a Goldin , 2000b . 5 In addition, Abrahamsen (2015) gives a revealing account of Onega, located at the end of the Onega River, at the southern littoral of the White Sea. This work also includes an interesting account of the hardships involved in maintaining working sawmills. In February 1920, after a period of civil war (1918) (1919) (1920) in which their opponents were supported by the Allies, the Bolsheviks took definitive control in the North. After a delay, the sawmills were nationalized.
In the history of Russnorvegoles, the Norwegian officer and businessman Frederik Prytz (1878 Prytz ( -1945 was one of the most important figures. 6 He arrived in Archangelsk in the second half of 1909, after having been on the lookout for some time for prospects other than those of an officer. What followed was his exceptionally rapid and successful establishment in the pre-revolutionary Russian timber industry. Following a short period as an employee, he started his own business. This led him to do business with a Londonbased Norwegian timber merchant, and to the formation of the Russia-based Prytz & Co., as registered in Russian sources and pointed out by Tevlina (1994) . In 1913, Union & Co.
joined Prytz & Co., bringing in fresh capital. Union & Co. was a major entity in the Norwegian timber industry, and the motive of the collaboration was to secure this company's timber supplies in Norway. In addition, the new partner was willing to engage in sawmill operations. After World War I had begun, a sawmill located in a northern district of central Archangelsk (Maimaksa) was taken over. In the spring of 1915 it burned down, but a rebuilt mill was in operation just under one year later. In 1916, Prytz & Co. took over two sawmills in Onega.
In Norway, whose neutrality -enabling business to take place with both Allied and Central Powers parties -had led to a booming stock market, Prytz saw the possibilities that flotation could bring about. Prytz Kiaer (1863 Kiaer ( -1939 , an account of whom can be found in Sogner (2001) . Prytz played an important role in the events that followed.
The Establishment of Russnorvegoles
Of course, with the October Revolution the prospects of the RFI were fundamentally altered. Nevertheless, until the beginning of 1920 it remained possible to continue operations, under challenging conditions, with the help of among others, Egil Abrahamsen (1893 -1979 Lieberman (1881 Lieberman ( -1946 was, at the time, a Russian timber expert who wielded great political influence, as outlined in his memoir (Liberman 1945) . 12 He played an important role in establishing the State Timber Trust of the Northern White Sea District (Severoles) to administer the timber interests of the new regime in the White Sea area. 13 Severoles was the first state trust established in the Soviet Union, and provided a model for later examples (Liberman 1945, 99) . As president and managing director of Severoles, Danishevsky (1923) and Lieberman (1923) 
Structural Factors
Section 34 of the concession contract states that the concession was limited to twenty years, with the possibility of extension. Reflecting the types of activities they had in mind, the perspectives of the parties were long-term. 
Operations and Profitability
South of the small town of Onega were the forests Russnorvegoles was offered to exploitthat is, forest plots of the Onega River basin, contractually fixed to roughly 2,900,000 desyatina, or 31,163 square kilometres, of which close to 70 percent was forestland.
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Geographically, the Onega River basin is considerably more extended. The concession was among the most significant ones, but it offered challenges as well as opportunities.
According to Saitzev (1923) , "The conditions of work in the forest district in the Onega basin, are, however, very unfavourable, especially with regard to the floating and the shipping of timber to foreign countries." Drifts would have to be cleared. Moreover, the port of Onega had to be deepened so that shipping became simpler, eliminating the need to use barges for the first stage of transportation. It was cheerfully assumed that this was something that could be solved by Russnorvegoles, which was soon to be formed.
In September 1923, according to Astrup (2011, 37) , Prytz and others went to Onega to start work. What they encountered was characterized by Prytz (1925, 3) as "in a very unsatisfactory state." In addition, labour relations differed from what they were used to.
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Under the Soviet government, labour relations now included trade unions and complex regulations (see Abrahamsen 2015) . After the end of concessions, Sutton (1968, 260) points out that this "was followed by the operation of the same northern lumber areas by percent. Prytz discussed factors such as sales prices, the exchange rate and productivity, and other factors determining costs of production, all of which contributed to this situation.
In particular, the exchange rate fixed at the end of the monetary reform process, in May In his report, Prytz (1925) pointed out clearly that something had to be done.
Otherwise, one had to realize that "the question of a final liquidation of our Company [has] to be considered." Lobbying was clearly required, now more directly addressing the complexities of Soviet politics. Already in the autumn of 1924, the central authorities in
Moscow had been successfully approached on some issues relating to costs. But this was not enough: variable costs of export continued to exceed proceeds from sale. Leonid B.
Krasin (1870-1926), people's commissar for foreign trade and a prominent Soviet diplomat, was approached jointly by Russangloles, Russhollandoles and Russnorvegoles, and presented in full with problems associated with profitability -first in a meeting with Krasin in Paris, and later in writing (see Prytz 1925, 4-6 , including a letter to Krasin on 19
May 1925). Krasin had been a very prominent and influential Bolshevik from the start.
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At the time of the meeting, however, Liberman (1945, 168-169) was of the opinion that Krasin's political position was less secure. As is well-known, this was associated with the very demanding and time-consuming questions of both foreign and internal trade that were being addressed by Krasin.
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Partners Drift Apart
The NEP was introduced in a relatively clear and open manner, but its final stages were implemented differently. According to Nove (1989, 126) (the names successively taken by the secret police under his command). Liberman (1945) offers an account, based on his personal experience, of how the secret police was active through its economic section with special economic monitoring functions. Dzerzhinsky was succeeded as head of the VSNKh by Valerian Kuybyshev (1888 Kuybyshev ( -1935 , who sided with Stalin in distancing himself from Trotsky, just as Dzerzhinsky had.
In this section, we take a closer look at events following the process of establishing Russnorvegoles. The complexity of this process reflects several complicated and interconnected circumstances that were about to arise. First, as hinted at above, these had to do with Soviet politics and institutional arrangements. Second, probably on the direct personal initiative of managing director Prytz, Russnorvegoles was about to take action in more politically sensitive directions, including changing its ways of doing business. In all this, the role of the Main Concession Committee in overseeing Russnorvegoles was important. In relation to this, one problem is that, as far as we are aware, a comprehensive and scientifically researched history of this
institution has yet to be presented.
From Prytz (1925) , it is clear that something had to be done. The first outcome was a surprising swing in the company's sales towards the domestic Soviet market. At the same time, it urged the Main Concession Committee to alleviate working conditions through an amendment to the initial concession contract. The important role that the Soviet market played in 1926 is well documented. According to Abrahamsen (2015 Abrahamsen ( ), in 1926 three big ships loaded with sawn goods were sent around Europe to the Black Sea.
Moreover, Benjamin Vogt (1965 Vogt ( , 1966 reports on how he was sent to oversee unloading. 32 The destinations included Odessa, Myklaiv/Nikolaev and Mariupol. Parts of these shipments were redirected to Batum because of a devastating earthquake. It is said that the Black Sea shipments amounted to 5,500 standards, later corrected to 5,045
standards. These shipments were minor parts of the project of turning to the domestic market. It is said that 18,000 standards were shipped through Kem (a station on the November 1926, however, had been altered. The end-result included both negative and positive elements, though the former outweighed the latter.
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Somewhat surprisingly, early in the process of negotiation with the Concession Committee, the question was raised of a more fundamental redesign of the concession agreement. What was proposed was a conversion of Russnorvegoles into a "pure concession" -that is, a concession granted to a wholly Western-controlled company, referred to by Sutton (1968, 7-8) were finalized in a second round of licensing by an authority established for the purposethat is, the licencing of transfers for the settlement of obligations between internal and external counterparties. 48 The measures taken, ending with the decree of 9 July 1926, were less critical for deals already underway in the double-licencing system for imports. 
Bypassing the Decree of 9 July 1926
The concession contract granted Russnorvegoles considerable freedom when it came to the purchase and import of roubles. 50 The decree of 9 July 1926 about the export of roubles was concerned with regulating their more or less free export -an activity Russnorvegoles was not typically involved in. Hence, it is not immediately obvious how the company was brought into a position that prompted accusations of its having violated the decree. By Blum & Co. arrangement was contrary to Soviet law, and thus had to be terminated.
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Russnorvegoles concluded two contracts with Bernheim Blum & Co., both dated 11 October 1926. 52 The first, on currency transactions, stated that the Berlin bank would sell the roubles required at the official exchange rate against sterling, with up to £50,000 in uncovered amounts. In the second agreement, credit of £100,000 was offered. Obviously, in exchange for roubles, the Berlin bank did not bring foreign currency into the Soviet Union that was credited to the foreign currency account of the Gosbank. Something was on offer that differed from normal practice. Inside the Soviet Union, an easily available alternative was to acquire rouble obligations paid for in the West, which in due course yielded a return in roubles. This implies the set of relationships outlined in Figure 1 .
Transactions with "other parties" were most likely effected at the official exchange rate.
Bernheim Blum & Co. was compensated based on commissions. The arrangement was such that, sooner or later, it would become clear that Russnorvegoles was far from contributing with foreign currency, as it would normally have had to. In concentrating on what is depicted in the upper part of Figure 1 , Prytz played this down, arguing that the arrangement conformed with the terms given in Section offered a favour in being able to convert roubles to pounds. This prompts the question of how the party who made all of this possible (Prytz) was included, and thus compensated.
Our sources are less than fully clear; in proceeding, it is helpful to separate the currency issue as three sub-problems: first, the problem of what happened and its economic implications, such as those outlined above; second, the question of who the "other parties"
were (discussed immediately below); and third, the problem of transfers between the parties involved. Since it is related to how the Western interests involved in Russnorvegoles were restructured, this last problem is discussed in subsequent sections.
In Astrup (2011, 44) , it is stated that (here rendered in translation) "the involvement was likely of Western businessmen who were owners of rouble obligations they were unable to escape. Pointing to a question related to the currency issue, Vogt (1966, 88-93 ) remarks on Soviet bills of exchange drafted in England. 53 These bills were typically "long", offering generous credit of up to one year. Bills were sold and bought at up to 25 percent less than their nominal pound value, paid on maturity. That is, settlement risks were regarded as considerable, most likely due to Soviet currency regulations. In approaching the Russian importer/bill drawee to pay in roubles in a specified manner inside the Soviet Union, any loss due to default in pounds was avoided. In addition to this, less expensive roubles were eventually made available. These would all have been areas in which the assistance of Bernheim Blum & Co. could have proved helpful. As to the "other parties" identified in the illustration above, Astrup (2011, 44) is less likely that bonuses could have been granted using the official method. This points to the possibility of an "extraordinary rouble chest" -that is, something other than an ordinary company account inferred by Dahl (1991, 129-131) . Fifth, being a company account, it should have been liquidated at some point, and the remaining balance transferred back to Russnorvegoles. Sixth, roubles were paid in and transferred as before after the engagement of Quisling as a diplomat.
Most significantly, it is also recorded that cheques were drawn to "ego" (Quisling himself). These payments amount to the impressive total of 16,000 roubles -roughly equivalent to three years or more very good salaries in Norway. From the end of 1927 to 4
November 1929, cheques were drawn more and more often to "ego", and in increasing amounts. Quisling came home from Russia well furnished with art objects and furniture. Dahl (1991) provides photographs of the grandiose interiors of his Oslo residence. This is how a generous rouble bonus was repatriated to Norway.
Towards the End: The Restructuring of Western Interests
Year 1927 saw a swing back to exports, even though this is not reflected in the figures reported by Jungar (1974, 170) for this year. 59 In addition, 1927 was the last full year in which the Western owners were involved in Russnorvegoles. Before this point, Western interests were restructured.
In the spring of 1917, the RFI seemed promising. The standard owner's capital of 8,000 shares at 1,000 kroner per share was more than fully subscribed. Preference shares up to 3,000 shares, at 1,000 kroner per share, were issued around the turn of 1918/19. A subscription of 1,277 shares indicated that prospects were less than promising. 60 In fact, the RFI never contributed dividends, and the engagement in Russnorvegoles did not provide a return. In addition, the RFI's Norwegian bank was on occasion forced to come up with favourable arrangements, so as to avoid bankruptcy. Around the turn of 1926/27, the patience of what was then Andresens og Bergens Kreditbank was finally exhausted.
The restructuring of loans led to a total debt of 1,681,596.19 kroner, equivalent to about £88,500 -an obligation the RFI was not able to sustain. Worth much less than this, and in any case difficult to sell, the RFI's main asset was its shares in Russnorvegoles. 
The Soviet Takeover
As we have seen, the renegotiated concessionary arrangement ended on 3 July 1928.
Around the turn of 1927/28, various options appeared to be available: first, converting to a purely foreign-owned concession; second, remaining, as up to this point, a mixed concession, subject to renegotiation; and third, incorporating foreign interests into Nielsen and Tevlina (2014) . In parallel, based on their strong connections in general staff circles, involving some centrally placed officers, they planned a pre-emptive military coup d'état. This fitted well with their belief in an authoritarian, fascist political regime, and is firmly documented by Borgersrud (2010 3. Repnevskij (2013) , in referring to the work of Ovsyankin, points to industrially organized activities that took place long before that.
4. Astrup (2011) points out that, in 1917, roughly nine out of forty sawmills in the area were in Norwegian hands. Tevlina (1994) reports that, in the Arkhangelsk province, about twenty large timber industry companies had been founded by foreigners -that is, close to half of the sawmills (forty-four) operating in 1917.
Eleven Norwegians owned sixteen or seventeen sawmills. In one rare case, ownership was Russian-Norwegian. For added details, see also Björklund (2000) .
5. Kotsonis (1992) is of interest for the interregnum in the North -as, in a very different way, is Fraser (1984) .
6. The importance of Prytz is underlined by the interest shown in him in Russia, such as by Repnevskij (2010) .
7. Seen in the protocols of the organs of the RFI in the National Archives of Norway. Sølverud (1992) offers an analysis of the initial subscribing shareholders of the RFI.
8. For details on Prytz and the Central Office, see Nielsen & Tevlina (2014, 516-518) .
9. This is the first of two volumes on Quisling. In 1999 they were reduced to a single volume and published in English. 13. According to Jungar (1974, 162-163) , Severoles was established on 17 August 1921.
14. Both articles were published in "Severoles," a company journal named after the company itself. Previously, Karl Danishevsky had been in charge of resolutely disciplining officers and soldiers of the Red Army. According to Liberman (1945, 85) , even if his prospects were not that good, Danishevsky did well, and after meeting with Stalin he told friends: "Stalin has forgiven me." As clear from " London & Northern Trading Co. (1929 -1932 kroner. According to Westlie (2015) , the general director of the State Railways was paid 33,000 kroner plus extras in the second half of the 1930s.
22 . In particular, see Sections 9-14 of the "Concession Contract" of Russnorvegoles and Paragraph 2 of "Articles of Association," both in Christoffer Vig's Private
Archive. See also Liberman (1945, 136 24. See, for example, classics such as Zagorsky (1930) and Carr (1958) 48. See Goland (1994 Goland ( , 1252 Goland ( -1258 .
49. See Quisling's check books in the National Library of Norway. For the first three books, the Gosbank checking account number is 7356, and for the last one 256. 64. See also Zagorulko (2005, 383) , which uses sources found in GARF Fond 5446, op. Figure 1 . Flows-of-currency chart for Russnorvegoles' Bernheim Blum & Co.
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